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Abstract: Secure Hill cipher (SHC) modification based on dynamically changing generalized
permutation matrix, SHC-GPM is proposed. It provides better security than that of SHC due to the
significantly larger number of non-repeatedly generated keys ( 248 times greater for the parameters used
in the conducted experiments). SHC-GPM is shown to be robust against the brute-force, statistical attacks,
and is resistant also to known plaintext ciphertext attack (KPCA) due to dynamic encryption key matrix
generating. The proposed modification is applied for colour images encryption. Experimental results show
that the proposed modification is significantly more effective in the encryption quality of bitmap images
than SHC in the case of images with large single colour areas and slightly more effective otherwise.
Keywords: Hill cipher, matrix, generalized permutation matrix, dynamic key, key generation, image
encryption.

1 Introduction
The Hill cipher (HC) [1], [2] is computationally attractive as using multiplication of an mxm -sized key
matrix, with entries from Z N  {0,1,.., N  1} , by an m-component plaintext vector, with entries also from
Z N , to get a ciphertext vector, but it is vulnerable to the known plaintext-ciphertext attack (KPCA) [4]
because of the use of the static key matrix. The Secure Hill cipher, SHC, [3] uses a dynamic key matrix
obtained by random permutation of rows and columns of the master key matrix for each new plaintext. It
transfers the HC-encrypted permutation to the receiving side together with the ciphertext. Thus, in SHC,
each plaintext vector is encrypted by a new key matrix that prevents the KPCA on the vectors. But the
permutations are transferred HC-encrypted, and the master key matrix can be revealed by the KPCA on the
permutations [5]. A modification of SHC, SHC-M, [6] works as SHC does but without the permutations
transfer. Instead, both sides use a pseudo-random permutation generator, and only the number of the
necessary permutation is transferred to the receiver. It is shown in [7], [8] that both SHC and SHC-M fail
to hide an image if it has large same colored areas.
Another HC modification [5], HCM-H, also uses dynamic key matrix produced with the help of a one way
hash function applied to an integer picked up randomly by the sender to get the key matrix, and a vector
added to the product of the key matrix with a plain text. It is shown in [7], [8] that HCM-H fails to hide an
image if it has large same colored areas and it is vulnerable [9] to chosen-ciphertext attack because the
selected random number is transmitted in clear over the communication link and is repeated.
We propose the modification of SHC/SHC-M denoted as SHC-GPM. The SHC-GPM uses a generalized
permutation matrix (GPM), M t , each row and column of which has all zero entries excepting only one
entry co-prime to N, i.e.
if j  t (i ) then M t (i , j )  0,
(1)
if j  t (i ) then gcd(M t (i , j ), N )  1, i , j  1, m ,
where gcd denotes the greatest common divisor, t is a secret permutation over Z m , and t (i ) is an
element of the permutation t at position i. To get a new GPM for each new plaintext vector, before
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encrypting, each non-zero entry of M t is recalculated. The new key matrix in SHC-GPM is obtained by
quite the same procedure as in SHC/SHC-M but we use the GPM instead of the permutation matrix.
Entries of GPM are recalculated in a way allowing generating of a very large number of key matrices
without repetition. Security of the proposed cipher is significantly better than the security of SHC/SHC-M
because the number of non-repeatedly generated by SHC-GPM dynamic key matrices (number of dynamic
keys) is significantly greater than that of SHC/SHC-M (e.g., 248 times greater for m=8, N=256). Also, our
experiments show that SHC-GPM is more efficient in image encryption quality than SHC-M.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces SHC and SHC-M. Section 3 presents
the proposed cipher. Section 4 introduces the performance and encryption quality of the proposed cipher.
Security and statistical analysis of the proposed SHC-GPM are discussed in Section 5. A conclusion is given
in Section 6. In the Appendix, an example of encryption and decryption by SHC-GPM is given together with
the example of the images encrypted by SHC-GPM and AES.
2 Overview of SHC and SHC-M
Before beginning the overview of SHC and SHC-M, we define some notations which will be used
throughout this paper: T Mul , T Div , T Add and T Sub , is the time for the scalar modular multiplication,
division, addition and subtraction, respectively, T Move is the time to move or assign a value, T PRPG is the
time for pseudo-random permutation generator, T Xor is the time for xor-operation (exclusive OR). Note
that the number of clock cycles as an example for Intel 80486 to perform multiplication and division is 18
while it is 1 for addition, subtraction, move, and exclusive OR operation [10]. It is worth noting that all
matrices considered throughout the paper are m x m sized with entries over Z N  {0,1,.., N  1} , hence all the
operations in encryption/decryption algorithms are assumed mod N, where m (block size) and N (alphabet
cardinality) are selected positive integers (e.g., N=256 for gray scale images). Also, we assume that two
parties, A and B, want to communicate securely, and A is a sender, and B is a receiver.
The SHC is a modification of HC. First, we introduce HC, SHC and then we describe SHC-M. Suppose
two parties, a sender, A, and a receiver, B, want to exchange data using HC; they share an invertible key
matrix K. If A wants to encrypt a plaintext vector, P, he gets the ciphertext vector, C, as follows:
C  KP

(2)

P  K 1C

(3)

The receiver, B, decrypts C by

where K 1 is the key matrix inverse. The SHC differs from (2), (3) in the following. To encrypt a plaintext
P, A selects a permutation, t, randomly over Z m , builds a permutation matrix M t , according to (1) (but
with non-zero entries equal to one only), and gets K t by permuting the rows and columns of a key matrix
K

K t  M t K M t 1

(4)

The SHC encryption is then performed by (2), but using K t instead of K . Additionally, sender A encrypts
t by (2) using K and getting u as a ciphertext, and sends C and u together to the receiver. In order to
decrypt the ciphertext, B decrypts t from u by (3), gets (K 1 )t  (K t )1 from K 1 [3], and then reveals the
plaintext by (3), using (K 1 )t instead of K 1 . The number of dynamic keys used in SHC, NDK(SHC), is
NDK (SHC )  m !
(5)
The computation complexity of SHC, CC(SHC), can be calculated as follows. To obtain the K t (4) we
need to perform permutations of the rows and columns. Usually, to perform the permutation in one row we
need m moves, therefore m 2 moves are required for m rows; similarly m 2 moves are required to perform

the permutation over columns. Hence, 2m 2 moves are required. To obtain the ciphertext (2), we multiply a
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matrix with a vector which needs m 2  m additions and m 2 multiplications; similarly to encrypt the
permutation t we need m 2  m additions and m 2 multiplications, thus,
CC (SHC )  2m 2T Mul  2(m 2  m )T Add  2m 2T Move

(6)

The SHC-M [6] uses the same initialization and the same encryption/decryption technique as SHC. But
SHC-M assumes that the sender, A, and the receiver, B, share a secret seed value, SEED, which is used to
generate a pseudo-random sequence of permutations. In order to encrypt a plaintext, the sender, A, selects a
number k, and calculates
t  PRPermutationG (SEED , k , m )
(7)
getting the k-th output permutation from the pseudo-random permutation generator (k can be a block
number in the sequence of transmitted blocks, or its function and m is the length of the permutation).
Sender A then gets a ciphertext C as in SHC, and sends to receiver B both C and k.
In order to decrypt, B calculates t according to (7), and then gets the plaintext as in SHC. The number of
dynamic keys used in SHC-M, NDK(SHC-M), is given by (5) and the computation complexity of SHC-M,
CC(SHC-M), differs from (6) in the following. To generate the pseudo-random permutation (7) T PRPG is
required; additionally SHC-M does not encrypt the permutation t , therefore
CC (SHC  M )  m 2T Mul  (m 2  m )T Add  2m 2T Move T PRPG

(8)

We can assess T PRPG by consideration of RC4 [4] as a generator in SHC-M. The RC4 has two phases: the
key setup and pseudorandom stream generator. We neglect the key setup phase because it is used only
once in SHC-M for many permutations generated. In order to generate one output number, RC4 uses a
state vector which is a permutation that is changed by swapping its two elements to produce one output
number. To have significantly differing state vector permutation, we consider it as the output of PRPG
after m RC4 iterations each of which requires 3 T Add , 7 T Move , and 3 T M od , where note that
T M od = T Mul T Div TSub  2T Mul T Add is the time for remainder after division calculation. Hence,
T PRPG  m (6T Mul  6T Add  7T Move )

(9)

3 THE PROPOSED SCH-GPM
The proposed cipher has the same structure, initialization, and the same encryption/decryption techniques as those of
SHC and SHC-M, but it differs from SHC/SHC-M in the following. To start with, A calculates the permutation t
according to (7) and constructs a GPM, M t0 according to (1) but with non-zero entries now not equal to 1. We
assume N  2n (in our experiments, n=8), and use the numbers of Z N co-prime to N, Z N* , having the maximal
order

as

that Re dM ti

non-zero
(k )

 M ti

entries

of

(k , t (k ))  Z *n
2

M t0

;

we

keep

them

also

in

a

vector

Re dM t0

such

, i  0, k  1, m

*
It is shown in [11] that the maximal order of elements in Z n is
2

mo  2n 2 .

(10)
Also, we use a state vector, St, initialized by m zeroes, for key matrix modification; it works as a counter
and may be viewed as an m-digit number base mo : St j  Z mo is it’s j -th digit, j  0, m  1 . The plaintext
Pi is encrypted using the key matrix
K i  M ti 1K i 1 (M ti 1 )1 .

(11)

as follows
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C i  K i Pi  Re dM ti 1 ,

(12)

where  is XOR, i  0 , K 0  K , and
0, j  t (k )
M ti (k , j )   i 1
0
s
M t (k , j )  (Re dM t (k )) , j  t (k )

(13)

j , k  1, m

where

1, if St j  (St  1) j
,
s 

2, if St j  (St  1) j

(14)

and the new value of the state vector is calculated
St  St  1 .

(15)

The numbers in (14) and (15) are added in the base mo (10). If the new value of St obtained in (15) is
equal to zero, then a new permutation t is generated by (7): A selects a number of a permutation, generates
it, and transfers the permutation’s number to the receiver B so that he is able to generate the permutation
by (7) as well, and all the steps (11)-(15) above are repeated.
The communicating parties share invertible key matrices K and M t0 . The sender A sends to the receiver
B the ciphertext C i and the block number, i . Knowing i , B is able to calculate the key matrix K i using
(11), (13)-(15), and retrieve the plaintext as
Pi  K i1 (C i  Re dM ti 1 ) .

(16)

Next key matrix inverse may be obtained from the previous key matrix inverse by (11), with key
matrices replaced by their inverses. The computation complexity of SHC-GPM, CC(SHC-GPM), both for
encryption and for decryption, can be computed as follows.
According to (13)-(14), to obtain one modified element in M t(i ) , at most two multiplications are
required, therefore the time to modify m numbers is at most 2 mT Mul , where i  0 . Additionally, the first
part of (11) X i  M ti 1K i 1 , can be performed in m 2T Mul time due to the structure of M ti 1 ; similarly
m 2T Mul time is required to perform the second part of (11), K i  X i (M ti 1 )1 . Inverse is a transposition of

the original matrix with elements replaced by their inverses. Inverses of elements may be found using
lookup tables, and, hence time of finding the matrix inverse is mT Move . In addition, to perform (12), we
need time m 2T Mul + (m 2  m )T Add + mT xor . Also a new permutation will be generated once for each set of
mo m encryptions by (7), it may be neglected, and time mT Add is used in the worst case for (15). Hence,

CC (SHC  GPM )  (3m 2  2m )T Mul  (m 2  m )T Add  mT xor  mT Move ,

(17)

From (8), (9), and (17), we have approximately that

CC  SHC  GPM 
CC  SHC  M 

3,

(18)

Since 3m 2T Mul is the heaviest term in (17) and m 2T Mul in (8)-(9). For the case of used in our experiments
m=8 this ratio is
CC (SHC  GPM )
(3  82  2  8) 18  (82  8) 1  8 1  8 1)
(208 18  80)
3824
 2


2.
2
2
CC (SHC  M )
8 18  (8  8) 1  2  8 1  8(6 18  6 1  7 1) (64 18  184  8 121) 2034
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The number of dynamic keys of SHC-GPM is

NDK (SHC  GPM )  m ! mo m .

(20)

NDK (SHC  GPM )  8! (282 )8  8! 248 .

(21)

NDK (SHC )  8!

(22)

In the case of N=256, m=8,

according to (5), (10) and (20). From (21), (22), one gets
NDK (SHC  GPM )
 248
NDK (SHC )

(23)

for N=256, m=8, hence security of the proposed algorithm is substantially better than that of SHC.
4 SHC-GPM Performance and Encryption Quality versus SHC-M
We developed programs for simulating SHC/SHC-M and SHC-GPM in C# with a Pentium(R) Duo (3.0
GHz) processor with 1-GB RAM on Windows XP. In our experiments, several RGB images are encrypted.
Firstly, the image, P , of size NxM is converted into its RGB components. Afterwards, each colour matrix (R,
G, B) is converted into a vector of integers within {0,1,..., 255} . Each vector has the length L  NxM . Then,
the so obtained three vectors represent the plaintext P (3  L ) which will be encrypted using the block size
m=8.
We examine the encryption quality for three different images containing very large single colour areas:
Blackbox.bmp (Fig. 1), Nike.bmp (Fig. 2), and Symbol.bmp (Fig. 3). Also we examined the encryption
quality for an image that does not contain many high frequency components: Lena.bmp (Fig. 4). The
Girl.bmp (Fig. 5) is used as an example of an image containing many high frequency components. Each
image is encrypted using SHC/SHC-M and SHC-GPM . The quality of encryption of these images is studied
by visual inspection (Fig. 1, Fig. 2, Fig. 3, Fig.4, Fig. 5) and quantitavely (Table 1, used irregular deviation
based quality measure ID [12], [13], [14]). This quality measure is calculated as follows:
1. Calculate the matrix, D, which represents the absolute value of the difference between each pixel
value of the original and the encrypted image respectively:
D = |O - E|,
where O is the original (input) image and E is the encrypted (output) image.
2. Construct a histogram distribution of the D we get from step 1:
h=histogram (D)
with 256 levels.
3. Get the average value of how many pixels are deviated at every deviation value by:
DC 

1 255
 hi ,
256 i 0

4. Subtract this average from the deviation histogram and take the absolute value by:
AC(i) = |hi - DC|, i=0,..,255.
5. Count:
255

ID   AC (i ).
i 0

The smaller ID, the better.
Based on visual inspection (Fig. 1, Fig. 2, Fig. 3), it is obvious that the proposed scheme SHC-GPM has
better encryption quality than the SHC/SHC-M. The SHC/SHC-M fails to hide the plain-image of large
single color area, especially for the black color represented by zero value for both plaintext/ciphertext
obtained by SHC/SHC-M but SHC-GPM succeeds in hiding all the features of the image containing large
single colour areas (Fig. 1, Fig. 2, Fig. 3). On the other hand from the numerical evaluation of encryption
quality measure ID (Table 1), we note that the proposed scheme SHC-GPM versus SHC/SHC-M give
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better encryption quality. SHC-GPM, and SHC/SHC-M are all good in encrypting images containing many
high frequency components; SHC-GPM and SHC/SHC-M give nearly the same results but the SHC-GPM
is more effective (Table 1, rows 4-5).
Image/Algorithm
Blackbox.bmp
Nike.bmp
Symbol.bmp
Lena.bmp
Girl.bmp
Table 1 The numerical evaluations of irregular
SHC-GPM; the smaller ID, the better.

SHC/SHC-M
34036.281
23980.791
10482.25
10256
11459.55
deviation ID for

SHC-GPM
8960.135
13455.083
4289.96
10238.67
9791.92
encrypted images with SHC/SHC-M and

(a)
(b)
(b)
Figure 1 a) Original Blackbox.bmp encrypted by: b) SHC/SHC-M, c) SHC-GPM

(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 2 a) Original Nike.bmp encrypted by: b) SHC/SHC-M, c) SHC-GPM

(a)
(c)
(b)
Figure 3 a) Original Symbol.bmp encrypted by: b) SHC/SHC-M, c) SHC-GPM
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 4 a) Original Lena.bmp encrypted by: b) SHC/SHC-M, c) SHC-GPM

(c)
(a)
(b)
Figure 5 a) Original Girl.bmp encrypted by: b) SHC/SHC-M, c) SHC-GPM
We examined the encryption time for the Blackbox.bmp image having 138 × 138 pixels and 56.1 KB
size. The encryption time measured when applying SHC-GPM is 137 ms, while it is 59 ms when applying
SHC-M that complies with (19). Based on the encryption time, and the obtained number of clock cycles
according to (8), (9), (17), it is clear that SHC-M roughly is two-three times better than SHC-GPM in the
encryption time, but (5), and (20)-(23) show that NDK(SHC-GPM) is significantly greater than NDK(SHCM), therefore SHC-GPM is more secure.
5 Security and Statistical Analysis
The security of a cryptosystem is determined by the ability to resist all kinds of cryptanalysis and attacks
[15], [16], [17], [18]. Robustness against attacks is used to evaluate the security of our scheme. The results
show the satisfactory security of the SHC-GPM as explained and discussed in the following subsections.
5.1. Key Space Analysis
Key space is known as the total number of different keys that can be used in encryption. For a good
encryption algorithm, it is necessary to have a large enough key space to make brute force attack
infeasible. For the SHC-GPM, the key space is the same as that of HC [3], [19]. Therefore the key space of
the scheme is large; hence it is secure against brute force attack.
5.2. Known Plaintext-Ciphertext Attack
The KPCA is effective if a same key is used to encrypt many plaintexts. Similar to SHC [3], our proposed
scheme SCH-GPM is secure against the KPCA since each plaintext is encrypted by a different key, and the
number of such dynamic keys is significantly large (20). Equations (5) and (20) show that the NDK(SHCGPM) (20) is larger than the NDK(SHC) (5); hence SHC-GPM is more secure.
5.3. Statistical Analysis Resistance
A good cipher should be robust against any statistical attack. If this proposed scheme can confuse images
to the one with random distribution, then it is difficult for statistical attackers. To prove the robustness of
the proposed scheme, the statistical analysis has been performed. It is usually evaluated by the following
measures [15], [17], [20], [21], [22], [23]: calculating the histograms of the encrypted images and the
correlation of two adjacent pixels in the plain/encrypted image demonstrating their superior confusion and
diffusion property. The obtained results show that SHC-GPM strongly withstands statistical attacks.
5.3.1. Histograms of encrypted images
We have computed and analyzed the histogram of the encrypted image as well as its original image; a
typical example is given in Fig. 6. The histogram of the encrypted image is very close to uniform
distribution; it is significantly different from the original image, and bears no statistical resemblance to the
original image.
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Figure 6 Histogram of RGB layers for original/encrypted Nike.bmp: a) SHC-GPM-encrypted, b)
histogram of the original image, c) histogram of SHC-GPM-encrypted.
5.3.2. Correlation of Two Adjacent Pixels
There is a very good correlation between adjacent pixels in the plain-image. We studied the correlation
between two adjacent pixels in plain-image and encrypted image in three different orientations (horizontal,
vertical and diagonal). We use the following procedure: first 1000 pairs of two adjacent pixels in three
different orientations are selected randomly from image to test correlation, and then we calculate the
correlation coefficient C.C (explained in the Appendix) of each pair.
Table 2 shows the numerical evaluation of the calculated correlation coefficients of two adjacent
pixels in Nike.bmp encrypted by SHC/SHC-M and SHC-GPM in three different orientations as a practical
example. It is clear that, the neighboring pixels in the plain-image have a very high correlation while they
have a very small correlation (the closer to zero, the better) for encrypted image. This proves that the
proposed encryption scheme SHC-GPM satisfies very small correlation and is better than SHC.

Encrypted Image
SHC/SHC-M
SHC-GPM
Horizontal 0.9413
0.0849
0.0583
Nike.bmp Vertical
0.9031
0.1484
0.0098
Diagonal
0.9801
0.5743
0.0140
Table 2 Correlation coefficients of two adjacent pixels in original and SHC/SHC-M-encrypted images and
SHC-GPM-encrypted images.
Image

Direction

Plain Image

6 Conclusion
A new cipher, SHC-GPM, is presented that is a modification of SHC/SHC-M. In this paper, SHC/SHC-M
and the proposed SHC-GPM have been implemented for image encryption. Quality of image encryption is
studied using visual inspection and numerical quality measures. From the obtained results, it follows that
the proposed SHC-GPM is more effective in encryption quality than SHC/SHC-M especially for images
having substantial same color areas (see Fig. 1, Fig. 2, Fig. 3, Table 1). Versus SHC/SHC-M, the proposed
cipher SHC-GPM significantly increases the security, based on the greater number of dynamic keys used
(see (23)). These improvements are got by expense of two-three times decreasing performance because
SHC-GPM uses generalized permutations matrices which need approximately three times greater number
of multiplications compared to the permutations used by SHC/SHC-M. An important feature of the
proposed cipher is the use of numbers having known in advance maximal order (10) allowing guaranteeing
non-repeating sequence of the key matrices of any length by respective choice of the parameters (for
parameter values used in the reported experiments, the length (NDK) is given by (21)). Proposed for SHC-
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GPM method of the sequence of keys generation (represented by (7), (10), (11), and (13)-(15)) might be
used also as a basis for a cryptographically strong pseudo-random number generator with guaranteed very
large period. SHC-GPM resists the KPCA because of the use of dynamically changing key matrices similar
to SHC but the proposed SHC-GPM is more secure than SHC because of the significantly larger number of
dynamic keys generated: (20) versus (5). Experimental analysis also shows that the SHC-GPM resists the
statistical attacks.
APPENDIX

Correlation Based Quality Measure
A good encryption algorithm must produce encrypted image totally random patterns hiding all the features of the
original image; the encrypted image must be independent of the original image. This means that the two images must
have a correlation coefficient very close to zero. The correlation coefficient is given by the following expression:
N

C .C 

 (x
i 1

N

 (x
i 1

where E (x ) 

1
N

i

i

 E (x ))( y i  E ( y ))

 E (x ))

.

N

2

(y
i 1

i

 E ( y ))

2

N

 x , x and y are grayscale values of two adjacent pixels of the original and encrypted
i 1

i

images. Note that: the closer C.C to zero, the better.
SHC-GPM Encryption and Decryption Example
 43
 0 173
14 95 
0 43
0
0 1
Let N=256, m=2 , St  [0,0] , t  [2,1] , M t0  
 , (M t )  131 0  , Re dM t  37  , K   3 27  ,
37
0
 







and the plaintext to be encrypted is “251, 241, 13, 25, 28, 31”. Note that by (10), mo  282  64 in the case of
 27 95  215 21 
N=256, det(K )  93mod 256 , and K 1  245  

.
 3 14   33 102
First block key and encryption:
371  129 137   0 173  27 45
 0 43 14 95   0
K1  






 , then
37 0   3 27   431
0   6 187  131 0  177 14 
 27 45  251  43  214  43  253
C1  

   
   

177 14   241 37 185  37 156 

Second block key and encryption:
St  [0,1] by (15) and according to (13)-(14) M t1 (1, 2)  M t0 (1, 2)  (Re dM t0 (1))2  433  147 ,

M t1 (2,1)  M t0 (2,1)  (Re dM t0 (2))1  372  89

891  163 10   0 233  14 91
 0 147   27 45  0
K2  






 ,
89 0  177 14  1471
0   99 165 155 0   231 27
 14 91 13  147  153 147 10
then C 2   231 27   25   89    94    89    7 

  
   
  

Third block key and encryption:
St  [0, 2] by (15) and according to (13)-(14)
M t2 (1, 2)  M t1 (1, 2)  (Re dM t0 (1))2  147  432  187, M t2 (2,1)  M t1 (2,1)  (Re dM t0 (2))1  89  37  221
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2211  189 185  0 117   27 97
 0 187   14 91  0
K3  







 ,
 221 0   231 27  1871
0   22 143 115 0   61 14 
 27 97   28 187  179 187   8 
then C 3   61 14   31   221   94    221  131 .

  
 
 
  

Thus far, the ciphertext is “253, 156, 10, 7, 8, 131”.
The decryption process is depicted as follows. Since the receiver has the key matrices K , M t0 and the encrypted
block number, the receiver can calculate the inverse of the key matrix K i1 using (11), (13)-(15) as in encryption
process, and use (16) to retrieve the plaintext.
First key matrix inverse according to (11):
 0 43  215 21   0 173 102 239
K 11  



 . Then, according to (16)
37 0   33 102 131 0  155 215
102 239   253  43  102 239  214  251
P1  
  
      


.
155 215  156  37  155 215 185   241
Second block key and decryption:
 0 147  102 239  0 233  215 233
K 21  



 .
89 0  155 219 155 0   237 102 
 215 233  10 147   215 233 153 13 
Then according to (16) P2   237 102    7    89     237 102   94    25

    
   
Third block key and decryption:
 0 187   215 233  0 117  102 43 
K 31  



 . Then according to (16)
 221 0   237 102  115 0  159 215
102 43    8  187   102 43  179  28
P3  
     
   
     .
159 215  131  221  159 215  94   31

Thus far, the plaintext revealed is “251, 241, 13, 25, 28, 31” that is equal to the original one.
SHC-GPM versus AES
To give adequate performance comparison, we examine our proposed SHC-GPM versus other well known algorithms
(e.g. AES). We examined the encryption quality of several images. Based on visual inspection, the proposed SHCGPM encrypts the images with large single colour areas (identical plaintext blocks), it successfully hides data
patterns. The AES fails to hide the data patterns for the images contain large single colour areas (Mecky.bmp: Fig. 8,
Penguin.bmp: Fig. 9, and bicycle.bmp: Fig. 10). That is, the proposed SHC-GPM has advantage in encryption of
identical plaintext blocks over the AES.
Image/Algorithm
SHC-GPM
AES
Mecy.bmp
12872.58
47726.75
bicycle.bmp
9736.79
25031.32
Penguin .bmp
6440.06
20745.34
Table 3 ID for encrypted images using SHC-GPM and AES, m=16.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 7 a) Mecky.bmp encrypted by: b) SHC-GPM, c) AES

Figure 8 a) Penguin.bmp encrypted by: b) SHC-GPM, c) AES.

Figure 9 a) Bicycle.bmp encrypted by: b) SHC-GPM, c) AES.
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